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NOTE
Collaborative Regulation: Cooperation Between State and
Federal Governments Is Key to Successful Immigration
Reform
I. Introduction
Dysfunctional. This is an unfortunate but appropriate description of the
United States’ current system of immigration regulation.1 Some
commentators place the blame for this regulatory breakdown on Congress. 2
Despite decades of effort, our government still fails to agree on the design
of effective immigration reform. 3 Consequently, individual states attempt to
regulate unilaterally. 4 However, in doing so, states must navigate hazy
precedent regarding the limits on their proper authority over immigration.
The recent Arizona v. United States decision sheds light on the continuing
struggle between states and the federal government and illustrates the
complexities of evaluating state authority over immigration.5
The tug-of-war between states and the federal government over the
power to regulate immigration has plagued the country throughout its
history. 6 The individual colonies were the first to consider how to properly
regulate immigration.7 Upon the nation’s creation, the federal government
began to step in. 8 The federal court system has since expanded federal
power over immigration, restricting “[t]he spectrum of possible state
participation.” 9 Courts ground this expansion on preemption. Preemption is
based on the Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution, which
mandates that the character of federal law takes precedence over state laws
1. Stephanie Condon, Despite Decades of Effort, Immigration Reform Still Eludes
Congress, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_16257567583/despite-decades-of-effort-immigration-reform-still-eludes-congress/.
2. Ilya Shapiro, States Can’t Regulate Immigration, but They Can Regulate Illegal
Immigrants: Remarks at the 2012 Charleston Law Review and Riley Institute Law and
Society Symposium, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 585, 587-88 (2012).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See Brittney M. Lane, Comment, Testing the Borders: The Boundaries of State and
Local Power to Regulate Illegal Immigration, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 483, 490 (2012).
8. 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
9. Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA.
J. INT’L L. 121, 130 (1994).
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and even disallows them in certain areas.10 A constantly shifting federalism
line between state and federal authority forces states to continually
reevaluate local immigration efforts.
As boundaries surrounding permissible state immigration action constrict
due to federal authority over the area, states become increasingly dependent
on the federal government for protection from the harms of unregulated,
unauthorized immigration. However, the federal government has
implemented a passive immigration policy, 11 perhaps motivated by a lack
of federal resources and geographic removal from much of the actual harm.
The result of this lenient federal policy leaves states with few options other
than accepting unauthorized immigration and standing virtually stagnant as
spectators. Though the federal government has been largely ineffective,
arguments and policy considerations support a uniform federal immigration
policy. Even with this in mind, the necessity of local involvement cannot be
overlooked. The need for both a state and federal presence begs for a
collaborative resolution.
Both state and federal governments have unique economic and social
interests at stake, but the current system fails to adequately address them
simultaneously. With consistent uncertainty as to where federal power ends
and state power begins, effective solutions to regulate immigration are
elusive. 12 One commentator notes that “[a]s a historical and practical
matter, federal competence to enforce immigration laws now stands in
serious doubt.” 13 As federal enforcement continues to disappoint, state
governments are attempting to fill the gaps in enforcement unilaterally. 14
Unilateral state regulation raises its own concerns, however, as immigration
is a matter in which the federal government must have a hand. Without
federal oversight, inconsistency among states would send mixed messages
to immigrants and foreign countries.
Arizona v. United States presented the United States Supreme Court with
the opportunity to determine the proper line between state and federal
immigration regulation.15 The Court considered one state’s proactive
attempt to curtail some of the predicaments caused by unauthorized
10. See Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress
or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4 n.2 (1995).
11. See Condon, supra note 1 (noting that no president from Reagan to Obama has
sufficiently enforced immigration legislation).
12. See id.
13. Spiro, supra note 9, at 128.
14. Id. at 129-30.
15. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012).
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immigration that were unique to its locale and the result of ineffective
federal policies. 16 Specifically, the case presented the question of whether
the federal government’s immigration objectives preempted, or invalidated,
certain aspects of an Arizona immigration bill.17 Of the four sections
challenged, the Court found three preempted.18 Some may view the Court’s
approval of a single section as a state victory; however, the section
approved has little impact on the immigration issues Arizona faces without
the support of the preempted sections. Additionally, the decision did little to
clear the murky waters surrounding immigration federalism. The decision
leaves states with few avenues to protect themselves and even less guidance
on how to navigate those avenues without crossing the federalism line.
To avoid these issues, the federal government should focus on
collaborating with states, accommodating the need for a uniform federal
policy while also addressing problems specific to particular states and
regions. Most federal programs already contain some degree of state
involvement. 19 For example, “[e]ven national defense incorporates the state
national guards.” 20 Immigration regulation should be no different. A larger
state role is crucial to effective immigration policies and implementation
across the country.
Further, collaboration between the federal government and states would
be an effective solution to local and national immigration problems. A
supportive federal government should guide states on what actions may
violate national policy, allowing each state to design unique solutions in
line with that guidance. This Note proposes a potential solution that mirrors
congressional management of the unique state interests in the water law
arena. In managing water law, in order to prevent laws inconsistent with
federal policy from violating the Commerce Clause, Congress has approved
certain state laws that would typically be invalid.21 This oversight-based
method permits unique solutions in unique locations with a federal safety
net ensuring each local method pursues the same national goals.

16. See id. at 2497-2500.
17. Id. at 2501.
18. Id. at 2510.
19. Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
57, 66.
20. Id.
21. See Scott M. Delaney, Note, The New Red River Rivalry: Oklahoma’s
Unconstitutional Attempt to Calm the Waters by Restricting the Sale of Water Across State
Lines, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 351, 354-55 (2013).
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This Note evaluates the Court’s Arizona decision and suggests a new
system for efficient immigration regulation. Part II illustrates how
immigration law and policy have developed in the United States and
describes the relevant law prior to Arizona. Part III focuses on the specifics
of the Arizona case and the Court’s decision. Part IV outlines problems
created by the questions left unanswered after Arizona and unregulated
unauthorized immigration in general. Finally, Part V proffers a path toward
cooperative, efficient enforcement of a uniform federal immigration
standard.
II. Development of Immigration Law in America
A look at the history of immigration law in the United States illustrates
that the questions that faced the Court in Arizona were not new. For
centuries, the Court has considered how to handle immigration and where
authority to regulate the area lies.22 The following sections explore the
evolution of the treatment of immigration from the colonial days to the
twentieth century.
A. Early Immigration Law
The individual colonies initially held the authority to regulate
immigration. 23 Upon ratification of the Constitution, the new federal
government claimed a stake in the regulation, and thus commenced the
nationalization of immigration laws.24
The first colonies each independently restricted immigration; for
example, “Plymouth Colony passed a law prohibiting individuals from
housing aliens [foreigners] without colonial authorization.”25 The fact that
similar laws appeared in other colonies illustrates that, at least initially, the
colonies individually exercised the authority to regulate immigration.26 The
individual colonies maintained this authority through the seventeenth and

22. See Historical Timeline: History of Legal and Illegal Immigration to the United
States, PROCON.ORG, http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=002690
(last updated June 19, 2013) [hereinafter Historical Timeline].
23. See Lane, supra note 7, at 490.
24. See id. at 495 (noting that the New York v. Miln Court viewed the Constitution as
“conced[ing], at a minimum, concurrent state power over immigration”).
25. Id. at 490 (citing EMBERSON EDWARD PROPER, COLONIAL IMMIGRATION LAWS: A
STUDY OF THE REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION BY THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 23, 23
n.1 (1900)).
26. Id.
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early eighteenth centuries.27 Any other regulatory structure would have
been unacceptable; as one commentator put it, “exclusive federal power
over interstate and international migration would have been highly
threatening under antebellum conditions.”28
Under the Articles of Confederation, states retained substantially more
authority than they currently hold under the Constitution, including powers
over naturalization and immigration. 29 From that point forward, however,
states gradually lost their stranglehold on this authority. When the
Constitution was drafted, it placed the naturalization authority within the
federal government. 30 For years certain authority remained within the
states police powers. 31 However, Congress, by passing legislation, and the
federal courts, by interpreting preemption, slowly and consistently
diminished states’ immigration authority. 32
B. Immigration Law in the Courts
After the Constitution placed certain aspects of immigration authority
under the umbrella of federal powers, state laws began facing challenges
under the Supremacy Clause. 33 This placed the Supreme Court in the
crucial position of drawing the line between state and federal power.
The Supreme Court initially focused on whether challenged state laws
violated the Commerce Clause.34 In 1837, New York required the masters
of vessels arriving at its ports to report pertinent information, including the
name, age, and last legal settlement, of all persons on board. 35 The federal
government challenged the law claiming it was a violation of the foreign
Commerce Clause. 36 The Supreme Court, in New York v. Miln, disagreed,
determining that as long as the end was legitimately within the state’s
police powers, a law was not unconstitutional merely because it was similar
to an act passed by Congress under a different power. 37 Thus, the Court
27. Id. at 491.
28. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776 – 1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1889 (1993).
29. See Gregory Fehlings, Storm on the Constitution: The First Deportation Law, 10
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 63, 69 (2002); see also Historical Timeline, supra note 22.
30. See U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 4; see also Historical Timeline, supra note 22.
31. See Lane, supra note 7, at 496-500.
32. Id. at 498-500.
33. See id. at 492-93.
34. See Neuman, supra note 28, at 1886.
35. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 104 (1837).
36. Id. at 118.
37. Id.
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held New York’s action was still within the police powers retained by the
states. 38
The Court confirmed that states had an important role to play within the
federal system: “A state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction
over all persons and things within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation;
when that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the
[C]onstitution.” 39 In its decision, the Court supported the idea that power
over the persons “admitted [into a society] is inherent in all
communities.” 40 Because this power belonged to the states prior to the
Constitution and was not relinquished therein, it remained with the states as
a police power. 41 Conflicting immigration interests of the different states
supported the policy of each possessing authority within their sovereign
jurisdiction. 42 Because immigration issues were local, the power to control
remained local. 43
However, in The Passenger Cases in 1849, the Court departed from that
reasoning when it found that New York and Massachusetts statutes
imposing taxes on alien passengers arriving in the ports of the states were
not protected as proper exercises of state police powers.44 This time, the
Court held that the state laws infringed on the foreign Commerce Clause.45
Although the states argued they were properly utilizing their police powers,
the Court ruled that taxes, even if meant to offset the financial burden
placed on the state due to the arrival of immigrants, ran afoul of the
Commerce Clause. 46 This was an area of exclusive federal authority. 47
The Court reinforced the exclusive nature of the Commerce Clause
twenty-five years later in Henderson v. Mayor of New York, when the
federal government challenged an amended version of the New York
statute. 48 The revised statute required the master of every vessel bringing
foreign passengers to pay a bond for each passenger landing in New York
City. 49 The Court unanimously concluded that state regulations meant to
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 147.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Lane, supra note 7, at 495 (citing Miln, 36 U.S. at 114).
Id.
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 408 (1849).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 408.
Id.
92 U.S. 259, 267 (1875).
Id.
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regulate the transport of foreign passengers and minimize social and
economic dangers “fell within the purview of foreign commerce and
exclusive federal power.” 50 The Court emphasized that a catalogue of the
passengers was an appropriate use of state police power, but that the
payment demand encroached upon the exclusive federal commerce
power. 51 The plenary federal power preempted state tax laws imposed on
state entrants, even under the guise of state police power. 52 Because
taxation on immigration was an aspect of foreign commerce, it fell within
the federal power. 53 This affirmation led to the federal government’s
ultimate plenary power of immigration through Congress’s swift passage of
federal laws in the area.54
The next significant step toward a more exclusive federal power over
immigration came in Chy Lung v. Freeman.55 In Chy Lung, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a California statute that required a bond
not for every arriving passenger (like in the New York statute), but instead
for only certain classes of individuals, such as “lewd and debauched
women.” 56 The state required the bond to prevent state “expense incurred
for the relief, support, or care of such person[s].” 57 The Court looked
further than the effect of the statute on the owners of vessels and considered
the effect the statute could have on the whole country. 58 For instance, if the
state held the passengers to an unfair standard, it “may bring disgrace upon
the whole country, the enmity of a powerful nation, or the loss of an equally
powerful friend.” 59 The Court worried that a single state’s actions could
bring about an international inquiry focused, not on that state, but on the
nation as a whole. 60 As a result, states could put the entire nation in a
position to face the consequences for their independent actions.61 The Court
concluded that the Constitution was not so foolish as to forbid states from
negotiating with other nations while leaving them the power to pass laws
whose enforcement would render the federal government liable for their
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Lane, supra note 7, at 499.
Henderson, 92 U.S. at 269-74.
Id. at 272.
See id. at 273.
Neuman, supra note 28, at 1887.
92 U.S. 275 (1875).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 279-80.
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repercussions. 62 Instead, the national power to deal with foreign nations
inherently invalidated state laws inconsistent with that power. 63 Otherwise,
a single state would have authority to “embroil [the country] in disastrous
quarrels with other nations.” 64 The federal government would be left to
answer for actions of individual states.
The Court continued to expand the federal government’s power over
immigration beyond regulations of foreign commerce in The Chinese
Exclusion Case. 65 In this case, the Court further justified federal
immigration power as an aspect of the nation’s external sovereignty. 66 In
the name of national sovereignty, peace, and security, the Court approved
congressional power to determine who may enter the country. 67 This power
also included the authority to deport aliens.68 This case significantly
expanded federal power in the immigration arena and “marked the nearcomplete federalization of immigration law and general displacement of
state and local regulation.”69 The Court had firmly established the foreign
affairs preemption and the ability to invalidate state laws that interfered
with the need for a single national immigration policy. “Thus was laid the
solid foundation for the modern rule of federalism in immigration law,
namely, that there is very little of it.”70 Instead of a distribution of power
between the federal and state governments, the federal government now
dominated.
C. Twentieth-Century Immigration Law
The next phase of immigration regulation involved continued state
attempts to pass laws impacting immigration while avoiding the federal
government’s plenary power over the area.
In Hines v. Davidowitz, 71 over half a century after The Chinese Exclusion
Case, the Court ruled on a Pennsylvania law requiring aliens over the age of
eighteen to register and carry identification cards at all times. 72 At the time,
62. Id. at 280.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
66. Neuman, supra note 28, at 1892.
67. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
68. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
69. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to
Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 613 (2012).
70. Spiro, supra note 9, at 138.
71. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
72. Id. at 52.
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there was also a congressional act requiring registration; however, the
federal law did not require the alien to carry identification.73 In Hines, the
Court clarified that immigration power is not concurrent; instead, state law
is subordinate to national law. 74 When the federal government passes a
statute “[n]o state can add to or take from the force and effect of such . . .
statute.” 75 Federal law should be “free from local interference.” 76 Because
the federal registration law was complete and comprehensive, the
Pennsylvania law “[stood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 77 For this
reason, the law was preempted. 78
In the late twentieth century, the expansion of federal power and focus
on federal exclusivity began to calm, and court decisions began to illustrate
that states have at least some role to play. In De Canas v. Bica, the Court
upheld a California statute that outlawed employers knowingly employing
aliens who were not authorized to work in the United States.79 The Court
determined it was a proper exercise of the state’s police power.80 Though
power to regulate immigration was exclusively a federal power, states could
pass legislation indirectly touching immigration as long as the measure
directly addressed state interests.81 Therefore, because the law addressed
employment, an area within the broad authority of state police power, and
there was no indication Congress intended to preclude state laws in the
employment field, the law was not preempted.82 Instead, the state law
operated parallel to federal law.83 Due to the significant state interests
involved, the Court refused to view the vast federal immigration scheme as
determinative evidence that Congress intended complete occupation of
other fields. 84 The Court clarified that a state law was not necessarily
immigration regulation just because aliens were its focus; 85 not every state

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 74.
424 U.S. 351, 352-54 (1976).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 355-56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 355.
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regulation touching immigration infringes on federal authority over
immigration. 86
Another case where the Court declined to expand federal immigration
authority was Plyler v. Doe. 87 Although the Court held unconstitutional a
Texas law preventing state funds from supporting the education of
undocumented aliens, it did so on equal protection grounds.88 This holding
prevented a narrowing of state police powers and left open the legality of
non-discriminatory police power regulation touching immigration. 89 The
Court confirmed the importance of state involvement when state interests
are impacted: “States do have some authority to act with respect to illegal
aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a
legitimate state goal.” 90
This line of cases shows that “state and local governments . . . cannot
directly regulate immigration, such as by denying admission into the state
or deporting people from their jurisdiction.”91 Even with these limitations,
however, De Canas and Plyler display that there is some room left for
states to indirectly regulate immigration under their police power. The
parameters of permissible state legislation remain unclear. The line between
appropriate and inappropriate state legislation is unfortunately quite grey,
and past immigration cases provide minimal guidance for preemption
analysis.
D. The State of Immigration Law and Federalism Today
The current state of the relationship between the federal and state
governments in the immigration arena is “bewilderingly complex.”92 “The
spectrum of possible state participation has been significantly narrowed by
the courts . . . .” 93 Past cases demonstrate that states do have some power to
police their internal affairs, including the effects of immigration. 94
However, they also illustrate the unpredictable, hazy nature of court
treatment of immigration issues.
86. Id. at 355-56; see also Jordan Jodré, Preemptive Strike: The Battle for Control over
Immigration Policy, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 551, 555 (2011).
87. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
88. Id. at 230.
89. Id. at 225-26.
90. Id. at 225.
91. Johnson, supra note 69, at 613.
92. Schuck, supra note 19, at 66.
93. Spiro, supra note 9, at 130.
94. John C. Eastman, Papers, Please: Does the Constitution Permit the States a Role in
Immigration Enforcement?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 577 (2012).
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When states attempt to pass immigration legislation, they must navigate
precedential hurdles, including the different types of preemption. “Whether
[a] federal law preempts state law is fundamentally a question [of] whether
Congress has intended such a result . . . .” 95 As immigration law is currently
interpreted, there are several ways state action may be preempted.96 Federal
supremacy “may preempt state law ‘by express language in a congressional
enactment,’ by implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional
scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by implication because of a
conflict with a congressional enactment.” 97 To ensure validity, a state law
must pass tests for express preemption, field preemption, conflict
preemption, and foreign affairs preemption.98
Express preemption applies when Congress explicitly and specifically
removes a power from the states. 99 The key question for courts is whether
Congress has made its intent sufficiently clear through a declaration that an
enactment will preempt state law.100 When determining express preemption,
a court must determine the parameters of congressional intent.101
“Field preemption occurs when Congress legislates in a field of law so
pervasively – or creates a comprehensive scheme of legislation – that it
implies that Congress did not want the states legislating in the same
area.” 102 Courts must determine that Congress intended to completely
occupy the field, leaving no room for state supplementation; 103 the federal
interest is so dominant that it precludes any state laws on the same
subject. 104 Henderson, for example, appears to be a field preemption
case. 105

95. Peatros v. Bank of Am. NT & SA, 990 P.2d 539, 542 (Cal. 2000).
96. Jonathan Futrell, Comment, Aliens in a Foreign Field: Examining Whether States
Have the Authority to Pass Legislation in the Field of Immigration Law, 63 MERCER L. REV.
1077, 1088 (2012).
97. Jodré, supra note 86, at 556 (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Dow Chem. Co.
v. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind. 2001)).
98. Futrell, supra note 96, at 1088; Patrick J. Charles, Recentering Foreign Affairs
Preemption in Arizona v. United States: Federal Plenary Power, the Spheres of
Government, and the Constitutionality of S.B. 1070, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 136 (2012).
99. Futrell, supra note 96, at 1088-89 (citation omitted).
100. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 578 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996).
101. Id.
102. Futrell, supra note 96, at 1088-89 (citation omitted).
103. Jodré, supra note 86, at 555.
104. Id.
105. 92 U.S. 259, 273-75 (1875).
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“Conflict preemption exists when the federal and state laws cannot
coexist or be enforced at the same time.” 106 There are two types of conflict
preemption. Impossibility conflict preemption arises when it is not possible
to comply with both state and federal laws simultaneously, and obstacle
conflict preemption occurs where the “state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’” 107 This preemption stands on the principle that state laws may
not frustrate the purpose of federal law. 108 For instance, Hines illustrates the
Court’s concern with obstacle conflict preemption.109
Foreign affairs preemption presents one more obstacle states must
avoid. 110 Foreign affairs preemption represents the court-recognized need
for a single national voice when dealing with other nations.111 “Because
immigration policy and the treatment of aliens implicate foreign relations,
the states have no acceptable independent role in the area; were it
otherwise, at the extreme a single state could, by offending a foreign nation
and prompting its retaliation, place the entire Union at peril.” 112 There is a
fear that a single state’s actions toward immigrants may change a foreign
nation’s attitude or position toward the United States as a whole and could
create national difficulties. 113 By way of example, Chy Lung presents an
application of the foreign affairs preemption.114
The preemption doctrines leave little room for state participation.
Because courts have found many areas within immigration law to be
occupied by Congress, it seems federal immigration law now operates in a
fashion similar to that of the Commerce Clause, having both active and
dormant corollaries. 115 The Commerce Clause of the Constitution vests
Congress with the exclusive power to regulate commerce between the
states. 116 This grant of authority has an impact even when Congress has not
affirmatively legislated in an area. State legislation is void, even in the
midst of congressional silence, if it would unduly burden interstate
106. Futrell, supra note 96, at 1089 (citation omitted).
107. Jodré, supra note 86, at 555 (quoting Gray v. City of Valley Park, No.
4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Jan 31, 2008)).
108. Id. at 556.
109. 312 U.S. 52, 80-81 (1941).
110. Charles, supra note 98, at 136.
111. See Spiro, supra note 9, at 144.
112. Id. at 122.
113. Id.
114. 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
115. Schuck, supra note 19, at 67.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
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commerce. 117 This is known as the dormant Commerce Clause. 118 This
feature prevents states from unfairly advancing their own interests at the
expense of national interests even when Congress has not acted. 119 The
dormant feature is concerned with the relative power between federal and
state governments and ensuring that state law does not interfere with federal
legislation. 120
Similarly, the Supreme Court has granted the federal government
ultimate authority over the immigration field.121 As courts strike down an
increasing number of state laws as inconsistent with the federal
government’s occupation of the field, this authority is becoming much more
exclusive. Like the dormant Commerce Clause, even if no federal law
specifically conflicts with a state-passed immigration law, courts may find
the state law inconsistent with the federal government’s plenary authority
over the area. Regardless of a lack of specific federal action, the
congressional occupation of the entire area creates a dormant aspect,
eliminating certain state action in the field.122 This dormant feature may
invalidate even innocent state measures.123 In fact, in the case of
congressional silence, it is often much harder for a state to properly
navigate preemption and pass a law that the courts will uphold. 124
Parameters of congressional intent are clearer when there is a specific piece
of congressional legislation in the area, sometimes providing escapes, or
specifying certain state action as permissible. The history of immigration
cases, much like dormant Commerce Clause analysis, makes clear that even
the dormant feature cannot prevent or interfere with certain action falling
under the reserved state police power. 125 Unfortunately, where this police
power ends is unclear.
The preemption doctrines and the parameters of federal immigration
authority are far from clear-cut, making it difficult to predict their
application. Any room the courts have left for states to regulate immigration

117. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
118. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 338 (2007).
119. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623-34.
120. Id.
121. Schuck, supra note 19, at 57; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581, 609 (1889).
122. Delaney, supra note 21, at 353 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)).
123. Spiro, supra note 9, at 157.
124. Schuck, supra note 19, at 87.
125. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
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is not expressly clear. 126 Courts evaluate preemption on a case-by-case
basis, but this makes it difficult to “read the tea leaves” and predict how
courts will treat provisions before them. 127 The current state of immigration
regulation forces states to face the consequences of failing federal
immigration policies with little remedy. As frustrated citizens pressure their
state governments to compensate for a lack of federal immigration
enforcement, states are acting unilaterally. 128 States continue to pass
immigration legislation attempting to avoid preemption, but these laws are
consistently challenged.129 Arizona represents just one state that attempted
to take immigration into its own hands, but it was swiftly followed by other
states: “Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and Indiana . . . frustrated by
Congress’s idling on immigration reform, have challenged federal authority
by taking it upon themselves” to create policies for undocumented
immigrants within their borders. 130 Many anticipated the Court’s Arizona
decision, seeking clarification of preemption issues and hoping for guidance
on how states could properly exercise their immigration authority.
Unfortunately, the case does not sufficiently define the lines of permissible
future state action and will lead to continued litigation in the area.
III. Statement of the Case
Arizona v. United States presented the Supreme Court its most recent
opportunity to resolve the immigration debate. 131 In 2010, faced with many
of the consequences of failed federal immigration regulation, the Arizona
legislature passed the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act (Senate Bill 1070) to “‘discourage and deter the
unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons
unlawfully present in the United States.’” 132 The United States filed suit
“seeking to enjoin [the law] as preempted.”133 Four sections of the law were
challenged:

126. Johnson, supra note 69, at 614.
127. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 588.
128. Id. at 587-88.
129. Johnson, supra note 69, at 613, 613 n.13.
130. Peter J. Spiro, Op-Ed., Let Arizona’s Law Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, at A19,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/opinion/let-the-arizona-law-stand-thenwither.html.
131. United States v. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
132. Id. at 2497.
133. Id.
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! Section 2 allowed officers to attempt to verify a person’s
immigration status upon an arrest, detention, or stop;
! Section 3 created a state misdemeanor for “failure to comply
with federal alien-registration requirements;”
! Section 5 created a state “misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien
to seek or engage in work in [Arizona];” and
! Section 6 gave authorization to state officers “to arrest without a
warrant a person ‘the officer has probable cause to believe . . .
has committed a public offense.’” 134
At the district court level, the court granted an injunction against all four
sections. 135 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then affirmed. 136 After
granting certiorari “to resolve important questions concerning the
interaction of state and federal power with respect to the law of immigration
and alien status,” the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. 137
A. Section 3
The Court first evaluated section 3 of Senate Bill 1070, which created
penalties for unauthorized aliens who failed to register as required by
federal law. 138 The Court read the provision as a requirement for
unauthorized aliens in the state to comply with federal registration laws.139
In its analysis, the Court looked to Hines v. Davidowitz, a case where the
Court determined that Congress created a “complete system for alien
registration” and intended for this system to be the “single . . . allembracing system.” 140 Though the federal regulations at the time of Arizona
were “not identical” to those in Hines, the system “remain[ed]
comprehensive.” 141 The Court used this as evidence that Congress intended
“the Federal Government [to occupy] the field of alien registration.”142 This
134. Id. at 2497-98 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1509, 13-2928C, 133883(A)(5) (West Supp. 2011)).
135. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339,
366 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
136. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 366 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
137. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498, 2510.
138. Id. at 2501.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70, 74 (1941)).
141. Id. at 2502.
142. Id.
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interpretation means that even state regulations that are complementary or
parallel to the federal system are impermissible. 143
Arizona argued that section 3 was not preempted because it shared the
same “aims” and “substantive standards” as federal law. 144 The Court
quickly rejected this argument as inconsistent with the premise of field
preemption. 145 State-created penalties for a federal crime undermine federal
prosecutorial discretion. 146 This “frustrate[s] federal policies.” 147 In addition
to the field preemption concerns, the Court mentioned the inconsistency of
the penalties proscribed by Senate Bill 1070 and federal laws. 148 Because
section 3 did not allow for a probationary sentence while federal law did,
the Court concluded Arizona’s law created conflict with the congressional
plan. 149 Ultimately, section 3 was preempted based on these conflicting
penalties and because it entered a field occupied by Congress.150
B. Section 5
Next, the Court analyzed section 5’s creation of a misdemeanor for
unauthorized aliens seeking employment. 151 Here, the Court began by
differentiating Arizona from De Canas v. Bica. 152 At the time the Court
decided De Canas, Congress had only expressed “a peripheral concern with
[the] employment of illegal entrants.”153 But when Arizona came before the
Court, Congress had passed “a comprehensive framework for ‘combating
the employment of illegal aliens.’”154 The Court viewed this framework as
evidence of an intentional decision not to impose criminal penalties on
those “seek[ing] or engag[ing] in unauthorized employment.” 155 Though the
Arizona law targeted employees while the federal system targeted
employers, it still conflicted with congressional intent.156 The Court

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2503.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976)).
154. Id. at 2504 (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147
(2002)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2504-05.
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reviewed the legislative background of these acts and found that a
congressionally established commission determined that penalties on the
employees “would be ‘unnecessary and unworkable.’” 157 While Arizona’s
goal to discourage employment of unauthorized aliens may have been a
good faith effort to mirror federal policy, the methods conflicted. 158 For this
reason, section 5 conflicted with congressional objectives by imposing
penalties where Congress deemed it would be inappropriate, and due to this
conflict, the section was preempted. 159
C. Section 6
The Court next evaluated section 6, which allowed state officers to make
warrantless arrests upon probable cause to believe a person had committed
a removable offense. 160 “[F]ederal statutory structure instructs when it is
appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process.” 161 Under federal
law, when an officer suspects a person of being a removable alien, the
suspected person is not arrested but instead given a Notice to Appear at a
removal proceeding. 162 Further, federal law calls for arrests after warrants
are issued and then executed by federal officers who have been trained in
immigration law enforcement.163 Outside of a warrant, federal law limits a
federal officer’s authority to make an arrest; he may only do so where the
alien is in “violation of any [immigration] law” and “likely to escape before
a warrant can be obtained.” 164 Section 6 of Senate Bill 1070 purported to
grant state officers less limited authority by allowing warrantless arrests. 165
Additionally, federal law already specifies instances when state officers
may “perform the functions of an immigration officer,” and Arizona’s law
would expand on those instances. 166 The Court held that both of these

157. Id. at 2504 (quoting U.S. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY,
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY
WITH SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS BY COMMISSIONERS 65-66 (1981)).
158. Id. at 2505.
159. Id. at 2504-05.
160. Id. at 2505.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2505-06.
164. Id. at 2506 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2012)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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expansions of state officer authority exceeded the authority granted under
the federal scheme. 167 As a result, section 6 conflicted with federal law.168
In its defense of the section, Arizona pointed to federal law allowing
state officers to “cooperate” with the Attorney General in immigration law
enforcement, meaning the state officers could assist in furthering federal
initiatives. 169 The Court, though, determined that the word “cooperate” did
not encompass “the unilateral decisions of state officers to arrest an
alien . . . absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal
Government.” 170 Because section 6 attempted to grant state officers
authority entrusted solely to the federal government, it was preempted.171
D. Section 2
The final section challenged, section 2, required the Court’s deepest
inquiry. This section required state officers making a stop, arrest, or
detainment to “determine the immigration status” of the person if there was
“reasonable suspicion that the person . . . [was] unlawfully present in the
United States.” 172 To perform these checks, state officers would contact
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a federal group that would
determine the person’s status by checking a federal database.173 The
Arizona statute stated that all persons were presumed to be lawfully present
aliens; “race, color, or national origin” may not be considered; and the
provisions must be “implemented in a manner consistent with federal
law.” 174 The United States argued that because section 2 required status
checks, regardless of whether federal enforcement priorities made it
unlikely that the Attorney General would seek removal, the statute
interfered with the federal immigration scheme. 175 The Court indicated,
however, that Congress had made no limitations on when state officials
may communicate with ICE about immigration status. 176 Congress allows
for state officers to communicate with the federal government involving
immigration status and requires ICE to respond to such inquiries. 177 Section
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 2506-07.
Id. at 2507.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012)).
Id.
Id. at 2507-08 (quoting § 11-1051(L)).
Id. at 2508.
Id.
Id.
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2 did not conflict with congressional legislation but, instead, fell into a
category of action encouraged by Congress. 178 This part of Senate Bill 1070
was not preempted. 179
While ultimately allowing section 2 to stand, the Court described
potential constitutional concerns with its implementation. 180 For instance, if
a person were detained for the sole purpose of determining his or her
immigration status, this would “disrupt the federal framework” by allowing
state officers, without federal oversight, to hold aliens for unlawful
presence. 181 The state argued this should be of no concern and drew
attention to the fact that the status determination could be completed after
the stop had been completed, while arrests and detainments, by nature,
allow more time for checks to be completed. 182 The Court submitted that as
long as stops, arrests, and detainments were not prolonged for an
unreasonable period for the sole purpose of determining status, Arizona
could avoid this issue.183 The Court, though, refused to determine at what
point a stop became unreasonably prolonged. 184 Based on uncertainty about
the section’s enforcement, the Court refused to assume that it would be
construed in a manner conflicting with federal law.185
Upon finding three of the four challenged provisions preempted, the
Court’s opinion closed by generally addressing the federalism question in
immigration: “Arizona may have understandable frustrations with the
problems caused by illegal immigration while that process continues, but
the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law.”186 This
holding leaves states on the sidelines while the federal government
continues to dominate immigration regulation and does little to truly define
the boundaries surrounding appropriate state action. Continued grey
parameters surrounding proper state action, along with inconsistent federal
enforcement, will continue to result in difficulties in particular states.

178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 2509.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2510 (noting that when possible, courts are to construe statutes in a manner so
as to avoid unconstitutionality).
186. Id.
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IV. The Court’s Inability to Mitigate the Issues Created by Uncertain
Boundaries of Federal Authority
A. Even the Court’s Proper Application of the Law Keeps States in the Dark
Because prior cases have previously defined the preemption doctrines,
many academics made varying predictions regarding the outcome of
Arizona. 187 Nonetheless, the doctrines these prior cases established can be
extremely unwieldy to apply. Looking at the decision now, it is difficult to
disagree with the Court’s reasoning and application of the pre-existing case
law in the area. The Court seems to have appropriately applied the
preemption doctrines as they stand and reaffirmed the federal power over
immigration.188 However, it remains unclear where the federal power ends
and state authority begins.
One of the more significant pieces of the decision was the Court’s
conclusion that section 5 did not appropriately mirror federal policy. 189 The
Court determined that Congress’s imposition of penalties on employers and
not employees illustrated a decision not to penalize employees. 190 This,
without more clear evidence of congressional intent, is a logical fallacy.
The legal premise that the inclusion of one means the exclusion of all others
does not always hold true. This demonstrates the problem with the
preemption doctrines. They are centered on interpreting congressional
intent, even when Congress has not clearly spoken. 191 It is not reasonable to
expect the Court to firmly establish the parameters of this unspoken intent.
Instead, courts must determine whether state laws conflict with this intent
one case at a time. 192
For this reason, the importance of Arizona is not in its holding regarding
the specific provisions of Senate Bill 1070 but in its affirmation that even
proper application of the preemption doctrines leaves states hardly better
off than before the decision. No matter its decision, the Court was unlikely
to clearly define the limits of the preemption doctrines. The current
doctrines force the courts to evaluate state action on a case-by-case basis
and provide little guidance on how states can properly participate in the
immigration arena. This, however, is not a problem the courts can solve.
187. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 94; Charles, supra note 98; Johnson, supra note 69;
Shapiro, supra note 2.
188. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.
189. Id. at 2505.
190. Id.
191. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 578 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996).
192. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/6

2014]

NOTE

421

The current system requires courts to act as middlemen between Congress
and the states, evaluating ever-changing legislative intent. Congress must
institute a system that cuts out these middlemen and make its intent much
clearer to the courts and states. In the absence of congressional action, the
continuance of today’s system will only lead to more of today’s problems.
States will continue to be pulled into court for honest attempts to participate
in regulation and protect their local interests.
B. A Lack of Federal Enforcement and Uncertain Boundaries of Federal
Authority Heavily Burden the States
The Court’s Arizona decision did little to empower states to participate
in the regulation of immigration. Even when approving section 2, the Court
issued a warning that the section nearly crossed the preemption line. 193
After this holding, states will continue to be subject to and reliant on federal
immigration regulation. This will prolong the state struggles that
unauthorized immigration creates and continue to drive a wedge between
pro-immigration and anti-immigration constituencies. 194
Unauthorized immigration presents economic and social difficulties for
much of the nation. However, the federal government’s attempts to remedy
these difficulties have been unsuccessful.195 States have indicated that “the
costs of educating students who [do] not speak English fluently are . . . [up
to] forty percent higher than the costs incurred for native-born students.” 196
In the healthcare industry, the cost of uncompensated care is rising as
unauthorized immigrants use those services at an increasing rate.197 There is
little debate that taxes paid by undocumented aliens are insufficient to cover
these costs. 198 In fact, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that
the tax income from unauthorized immigrants far from offsets their cost. 199
Even federal aid programs cannot make up the financial gap. 200
States ultimately have little option but to shoulder much of these
burdens. The federal government requires states to provide specific services

193.
194.
195.
196.

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509.
Spiro, supra note 9, at 130.
Id. at 127.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS ON THE
BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2 (2007) [hereinafter IMPACT], available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8711/12-6-immigration.pdf.
197. Id. at 8.
198. Spiro, supra note 9, at 126.
199. IMPACT, supra note 196, at 9-10.
200. Id. at 10.
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to individuals, “regardless of their immigration status.” 201 Due to this
requirement, state and local governments bear much of the cost of
providing education and healthcare services to unauthorized immigrants. 202
States also incur heavy law enforcement expenses as they cover the costs of
investigation, detainment, prosecution, and incarceration for state nonimmigration crimes committed by unauthorized immigrants.203
The CBO found states had little recourse for “avoiding or minimizing
[these] costs.” 204 The financial struggles states face due to immigration are
a reflection of the fact that
most tax revenues generated by immigrants, both legal and
illegal, flow to Washington, and many other benefits of
immigration (say, lower consumer prices) are also enjoyed
nationally, while almost all of the costs (say, burdens on locallyfunded social services, adverse effects on low-skilled Americans,
and immigrant crime) are borne locally. 205
That immigration imposes disproportionate burdens (for example, higher
costs of public benefits and services and downward pressure on wage rates)
felt more at the state and local level than the national level “suggests that
states are in the best position to assess and manage the tradeoffs among
conflicting public goals peculiar to their polities.”206
Additionally, states do not share these burdens equally. Just as in
colonial days, many immigration issues the nation faces are unique to
specific locales. Illustrative of this is the fact that the matter is hardly on the
political radar of most states, while in some states it is a key political
issue. 207 “[W]hat is essentially a non-issue in Missouri or Massachusetts has
become the most sensitive point of political conflict in states such as
California, Florida, and Arizona.” 208
Moreover, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Arizona, the impacts
of unauthorized and unregulated immigration are felt exponentially more in
a small number of states. 209 This disproportionate impact theory is
201. Id. at 1.
202. Id. at 3.
203. Id. at 9.
204. Id. at 3.
205. Schuck, supra note 19, at 80.
206. Id. at 70.
207. See Spiro, supra note 9, at 121.
208. Id.
209. See Fiscal Costs Map, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/
facts/facts3 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (showing less than a third of states spend over a
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illustrated by the fact that undocumented immigrants are concentrated in a
small number of states.210 Currently, immigrants are most concentrated in
the southern border states. 211 “Roughly half of all unauthorized immigrants
in the United States live in four states: California, Florida, New York, and
Texas.” 212 These states, more than others, deal with the difficulties created
by high volume immigration and have the most incentive for effective
regulation. For example, in 1994, California paid almost $1.8 billion for
undocumented alien incarceration, education, and medical services while
only receiving an estimated $732 million in total taxes from the same
population. 213 This leaves a $1 billion shortfall. Additionally, “in 2000,
county governments that share a border with Mexico incurred almost $190
million in costs for providing uncompensated care to unauthorized
immigrants. . . . [and] those costs are increasing rapidly.” 214
These are just some of the negative impacts of the current federal
immigration policy, and they illustrate that the federal government’s “de
facto benign neglect has not been a winning strategy.” 215 Greater state
involvement is needed in immigration regulation. While the nation as a
whole may have little motivation to clamp down on unauthorized
immigration, the states where unauthorized immigration is most
concentrated are left desperate for relief. Though these states are motivated
to regulate immigration, the case-by-case determination of the preemption
doctrines creates uncertain boundaries and leads to state stagnancy.
Congress must develop a program encouraging state involvement.
V. Collaborative Regulation: A Path Forward
The Court drastically understated the problem when it noted that
“[t]here are significant complexities involved in enforcing federal
immigration law.” 216 The questions the Court answered in Arizona were

billion dollars a year on immigration); Kit Johnson, Peter J. Spiro, Debate, Immigration
Preemption After United States v. Arizona, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 111 (2012),
http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-100.pdf (citing Arizona v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012)).
210. Schuck, supra note 19, at 79-80.
211. Spiro, supra note 9, at 125.
212. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1708 (2011) (emphasis added).
213. Spiro, supra note 9, at 126-27.
214. IMPACT, supra note 196, at 8.
215. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 587.
216. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012).
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difficult. It would benefit states and the judicial system to avoid such
questions in the future. The current system provides little clarity and fails to
regulate effectively. Even the federal government is aware of the issues.
President Obama acknowledged that the current system for immigration
regulation is broken, but Congress has been unable to pass an effective
reform package. 217 Unless future reform packages address the fact that
different problems in different states require different solutions, these
problems will remain.
The United States desperately needs a path forward. Successful reform
must harness and embrace state involvement. Reform efforts should focus
on creating a uniform federal immigration policy while simultaneously
harnessing state desires to join regulation efforts. Congress can encourage
and specifically define proper state participation while retaining ultimate
legislative authority through an approval process. The system this article
describes below avoids the current dysfunctional process, which consists of
courts attempting to interpret congressional action, followed by states
attempting to interpret court decisions.
The Court’s decision in Arizona does little to clear the murky water
immersing immigration law. Commentators argue that state authority over
specific areas may better serve legitimate federal immigration goals. 218
However, current state involvement is difficult because “[n]either the
Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts have precisely defined when a
state law bearing on immigration is consistent with, tracks, mirrors, or
reinforces federal policy.” 219 Why not design a program where courts do
not have to answer this difficult question? Rather than keep states buried in
a trial and error process where they are consistently attempting to navigate
federal preemption and taken to court to determine the legality of their
statutes, Congress should lend a hand to state governments, giving them
such authority and creation ability “fit not to deny them.” 220 Congress
should help states design local legislation consistent with national policies.
Nominal state participation in immigration will not be effective. Merely
allowing state officials to participate in federally designed immigration
problems will not satisfy the need for unique policies designed for the
unique problems in specific areas. Some states need stricter policies while
other states would benefit from more immigration-friendly policies.
Congress can tailor specific roles for states to play “without jeopardizing
217.
218.
219.
220.

Johnson, supra note 69, at 616-17.
E.g., Schuck, supra note 19, at 64.
Id. at 86.
Spiro, supra note 9, at 171.
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legitimate federal interests” while allowing states a greater role in design,
administration, and enforcement of immigration law.221 I call this system
“Collaborative Regulation.”
An example of how a system of this nature successfully navigates
difficult federalism issues is the congressional handling of states’ desires to
deal with unique, local water issues without violating the dormant
Commerce Clause. In order to avoid invalidating local water laws that
courts would otherwise strike down as inconsistent with the Supremacy and
Commerce Clauses, after states have created plans tailored to their specific
needs, Congress authorizes the state laws by adopting them as federal law
for the specific locale.222 In other words, these interstate compacts are
congressionally ratified agreements between the participating states and
interpreted as federal law. 223 This makes these local laws immune from
Commerce Clause attacks, allowing states to act in a way that would
otherwise conflict with the dormant Commerce Clause. 224
The process begins and ends with the federal government, but state
involvement is key. 225
Typically, Congress invites the states to initiate negotiations,
with the expectation that whatever accommodation is achieved
will receive subsequent congressional approval. Upon approval
by Congress a compact becomes a law of the United States.
Thereafter, the compacting states act to incorporate the terms of
the compact into their respective state laws. This dual
codification aids in the enforcement of the compact’s terms. The
federal codification ensures that states cannot back out, and
eliminates any potential for a dormant commerce clause attack
on the allocation. State codification ensures that every affected
individual water user will be subject to the benefits and burdens
of the compact. 226

221. Schuck, supra note 19, at 92.
222. Delaney, supra note 21, at 357.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Christopher H. Meyer, Interstate Water Allocation: The Law and Its Implications
for the Pacific Northwest, IDAHO WATER RESOURCE BOARD, 7 (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.
idwr.idaho.gov/waterboard/WaterPlanning/CAMP/RP_CAMP/PDF/2010/05-21-2010_Inter
stateWaterAllocation.pdf.
226. Id.
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Immigration regulation should mirror this system. Just as with state
water issues, the federal government is far removed from the unique issues
immigration presents states yet has dominant legal authority over the area.
However, “[t]he pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the
importance of immigration policy to the States.”227 States, though, do not
have the only interests at stake. As with interstate commerce, the federal
government has a crucial interest in overseeing the implementation and
protection of a uniform national policy. 228 To address both concerns,
consultation and cooperation between federal and state governments must
be a key feature of the immigration system. 229 Though the need for
cooperation is apparent, immigration policy has yet to achieve it
successfully.
Under Collaborative Regulation, states would still be obligated to respect
the federal plenary power over immigration by submitting to Congress’s
ultimate judgment concerning the legality and compatibility of statedesigned programs with federal interests. States could develop policies
designed to handle local problems while Congress could ensure that locallydesigned laws do not undermine federal interests. With Congress reviewing
and approving them, the state regulations would enjoy the force of federal
law, preventing preemption. 230
Alas, this collaborative system requires front-end state cooperation, as
Congress cannot force state participation.231 To achieve cooperation, the
federal government must willingly encourage state participation in the
design of immigration policies without handing over ultimate control.
Congress should proactively seek state involvement by requesting states to
design policies tailored to local issues. Currently, states are unilaterally
attempting to do this, with courts then determining whether the state laws
fit the national scheme.
Instead, Congress should request that states submit the proposals to it for
review and potential approval. Upon approval, Congress would implement
the state suggestions as federal law for the specific locale, just like the
congressional approval of state water compacts. This would prevent courts
from hypothesizing which state laws conflict with federal immigration
227. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).
228. Charles, supra note 98, at 147-48.
229. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508.
230. Delaney, supra note 21, at 357 (citing Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River
Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’g 590 F. Supp. 293, 296 (D.
Mont. 1983) (per curiam)).
231. See Jodré, supra note 86, at 556.
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authority. Congress can conclusively determine which laws can coexist
with a uniform federal policy. Instead of a federal government attempting to
address unique, local issues with a single system, a program mirroring the
water compact system allows each area to design a distinct solution for its
distinct issues, while maintaining a uniform federal policy.
Because Congress may not delegate its authority to legislate,232 it cannot
merely present a set of guidelines for states to meet and give blanket
approval to state laws meeting the guidelines. Congressional approval of
state action, such as through an interstate compact, avoids this issue
because Congress retains ultimate authority without delegating any power
to actually create federal law. States merely become cooperative agents of
federal policy. 233 The state and federal governments speak with one
voice. 234 In the case of water law compacts, in order for the court to treat
state law as federal law, Congress must have an “unmistakably clear” intent
to approve the compact. 235 This same requirement could be carried over to
immigration; Congress would maintain authority to set the parameters of
the nation’s immigration policy umbrella and state an “unmistakably clear”
intent to approve a state program as fitting within that umbrella.
If implemented, Collaborative Regulation will also allow for specific
feedback from Congress to states on what is compatible with the federal
policy. This would be much more efficient than courts attempting to
interpret congressional intent in the area on a case-by-case basis. Congress,
not the courts, will determine whether a state-designed scheme poses an
obstacle to federal immigration goals. Instead of requiring courts to
hypothesize about congressional intent, Congress will make this explicitly
clear. Congress will declare its intent expressly every time a state submits a
proposal by specifying what is consistent with that intent. This keeps the
legislative authority in the legislature and out of the judiciary.
Collaborative Regulation puts states and the federal government on the
same team. Immigration litigation is often adversarial between the state and
federal governments. A process encouraging them to work united toward a
common goal would create efficiencies. The current system wastes
resources as state laws wind through the court systems awaiting a
determination on their legality. These resources are better spent
implementing local plans that Congress has approved through a more
232. See United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932); see
also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
233. Spiro, supra note 9, at 159.
234. Id.
235. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984).
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expeditious process. Under Collaborative Regulation, state legislation such
as Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 is much less likely to clog the federal dockets
with challenges focusing on their consistency with federal law. Instead of
states attempting to pass laws affecting immigration that will not interfere
with national interests and waiting for judicial approval, Collaborative
Regulation encourages express authorization. While some may claim a
program of this nature is inefficient, forcing states to wait for congressional
approval before implementing a plan, it will be no more inefficient that the
current process that forces states to wait years while their immigration laws
are subjected to legal challenges in court. For example, Arizona waited over
two years for a determination of whether Senate Bill 1070 was
preempted. 236
Further, the success of a program of this nature in the water law arena
has proven the design to be both functional and rational. In contrast,
reliance on court determination is both inefficient and unpredictable.
Instead of trying to “integrate 50 different situations into a single one-sizefits-all national policy,” 237 Collaborative Regulation allows tailored
solutions in each state created to fit the specific contours of local
immigration.
Collaborative
Regulation
also
encourages
innovation
and
experimentation among the states, demonstrating what works without
subjecting the entire country to certain policies. “It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 238 This minimizes the
effects of failed systems and allows for a larger number of potentially
successful policies to be tested. Instead of the entire nation feeling the
impacts of a single policy and then altering it accordingly, each state can
sculpt its own process. The effects and externalities of flawed policies
would be contained to the states that designed them. States could then look
to their more successful neighbors and manipulate their policies to fit their
own needs.

236. Timeline: Chronology of Arizona Immigration Law Battle, CHI. TRIB. (June 25,
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-25/news/sns-rt-us-usa-immigration-courtchronologybre85o0um-20120625_1_republican-governor-jan-brewer-illegal-immigrantsimmigration-status.
237. Schuck, supra note 19, at 70.
238. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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“[E]ffective federal immigration enforcement often depends upon the
extensive participation of state and local officials.”239 Instead of friction
between federal and state governments, states should be eager to implement
Collaborative Regulation. A key factor to state participation would be
economic benefits.
State-level modulation of federal immigration policies could . . .
work to distribute the costs of undocumented aliens more
equitably among the states, and to encourage such aliens to
relocate to where their presence may pose a net social and
economic benefit, or at least not such a concentrated perceived
harm. The scalpel of state action replaces Washington's
unwieldy sledgehammer. 240
Collaborative Regulation allows for diverse solutions to the unique
complexities of a national problem. 241 Instead of federal and state
governments fighting for authority or declining to support the other’s
efforts, the two will be more eager to support policies they both played a
role in creating. This will generate a hybrid form of immigration policies,
harmonizing state desires with the need for a unified federal policy.
VI. Conclusion
Arizona charged the Supreme Court with the task of applying
unworkable doctrines to one of many state laws seeking to regulate
immigration within local borders. 242 The Court ultimately struck down three
of the four sections of the Arizona law that the federal government
challenged. 243 What the Court was unable to do, however, was create clear
parameters for appropriate state action. Even logical application of the
current preemption doctrines failed to create certainty in the area. The
perpetuation of the current system will continue to result in states passing
laws with no guidance as to whether they are permissible.
The United States’ current system for immigration regulation is wholly
inadequate. Though preemption prevents them from doing so effectively,
states are in the best position to deal with their own unique problems using
their own unique solutions. While these state interests are valid, there are

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Schuck, supra note 19, at 72.
Spiro, supra note 9, at 173 (footnote omitted).
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 212, at 1676.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
Id. at 2510.
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legitimate concerns that leaving immigration regulation in state hands may
interfere with national foreign policy.
For these reasons, the best solution is one that accounts for both state and
federal concerns. A successful program must consider concerns on both
sides of the federalism line. Because murky preclusion doctrines force
states to inefficiently guess at whether their needed regulations will run
afoul of the federalism line, it would suit all parties to avoid the application
of these doctrines altogether. This Note’s proposed system, Collaborative
Regulation, centers on state-designed programs and offers the original
solutions each state needs. Requiring congressional approval of these
programs prior to their enforcement as federal law ensures that local
policies remain consistent with a uniform national system for immigration.
This program merges state and federal involvement and avoids the “pin the
tail on the donkey” guesswork involved in determining the application of
current preclusion principles.
Brett Merritt
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